diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 0a378a8..bb0f9a1 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 
 		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
+				[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
 			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
 			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 7f1fa4f..2900d48 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -11072,8 +11072,8 @@
 R:	Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
 W:	http://tpmdd.sourceforge.net
 L:	tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (moderated for non-subscribers)
-Q:	git git://github.com/PeterHuewe/linux-tpmdd.git
-T:	git https://github.com/PeterHuewe/linux-tpmdd
+Q:	https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/tpmdd-devel/list/
+T:	git git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd.git
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/tpm/
 
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index b9250e5..f3f7215 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/async.h>
 #include <linux/pm.h>
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
@@ -291,40 +292,19 @@
 module_param_string(path, fw_path_para, sizeof(fw_path_para), 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(path, "customized firmware image search path with a higher priority than default path");
 
-static int fw_read_file_contents(struct file *file, struct firmware_buf *fw_buf)
+static void fw_finish_direct_load(struct device *device,
+				  struct firmware_buf *buf)
 {
-	int size;
-	char *buf;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
-	if (size <= 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	buf = vmalloc(size);
-	if (!buf)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	rc = kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
-	if (rc != size) {
-		if (rc > 0)
-			rc = -EIO;
-		goto fail;
-	}
-	rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
-	if (rc)
-		goto fail;
-	fw_buf->data = buf;
-	fw_buf->size = size;
-	return 0;
-fail:
-	vfree(buf);
-	return rc;
+	mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
+	set_bit(FW_STATUS_DONE, &buf->status);
+	complete_all(&buf->completion);
+	mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
 }
 
 static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
 				       struct firmware_buf *buf)
 {
+	loff_t size;
 	int i, len;
 	int rc = -ENOENT;
 	char *path;
@@ -334,8 +314,6 @@
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fw_path); i++) {
-		struct file *file;
-
 		/* skip the unset customized path */
 		if (!fw_path[i][0])
 			continue;
@@ -347,28 +325,25 @@
 			break;
 		}
 
-		file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(file))
+		buf->size = 0;
+		rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &buf->data, &size,
+						INT_MAX, READING_FIRMWARE);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (rc == -ENOENT)
+				dev_dbg(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
+					 path, rc);
+			else
+				dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
+					 path, rc);
 			continue;
-		rc = fw_read_file_contents(file, buf);
-		fput(file);
-		if (rc)
-			dev_warn(device, "firmware, attempted to load %s, but failed with error %d\n",
-				path, rc);
-		else
-			break;
+		}
+		dev_dbg(device, "direct-loading %s\n", buf->fw_id);
+		buf->size = size;
+		fw_finish_direct_load(device, buf);
+		break;
 	}
 	__putname(path);
 
-	if (!rc) {
-		dev_dbg(device, "firmware: direct-loading firmware %s\n",
-			buf->fw_id);
-		mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
-		set_bit(FW_STATUS_DONE, &buf->status);
-		complete_all(&buf->completion);
-		mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
-	}
-
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -685,8 +660,9 @@
 				dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
 					__func__);
 			else
-				rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(NULL,
-						fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size);
+				rc = security_kernel_post_read_file(NULL,
+						fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size,
+						READING_FIRMWARE);
 
 			/*
 			 * Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
@@ -1051,7 +1027,7 @@
 	}
 
 	if (fw_get_builtin_firmware(firmware, name)) {
-		dev_dbg(device, "firmware: using built-in firmware %s\n", name);
+		dev_dbg(device, "using built-in %s\n", name);
 		return 0; /* assigned */
 	}
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 45cc39a..274dd01 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@
 				 const struct tpm_class_ops *ops)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	int rc;
 
 	chip = kzalloc(sizeof(*chip), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (chip == NULL)
@@ -136,11 +137,17 @@
 	chip->cdev.owner = chip->pdev->driver->owner;
 	chip->cdev.kobj.parent = &chip->dev.kobj;
 
+	rc = devm_add_action(dev, (void (*)(void *)) put_device, &chip->dev);
+	if (rc) {
+		put_device(&chip->dev);
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+
 	return chip;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpmm_chip_alloc);
 
-static int tpm_dev_add_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	int rc;
 
@@ -151,7 +158,6 @@
 			chip->devname, MAJOR(chip->dev.devt),
 			MINOR(chip->dev.devt), rc);
 
-		device_unregister(&chip->dev);
 		return rc;
 	}
 
@@ -162,16 +168,17 @@
 			chip->devname, MAJOR(chip->dev.devt),
 			MINOR(chip->dev.devt), rc);
 
+		cdev_del(&chip->cdev);
 		return rc;
 	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void tpm_dev_del_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+static void tpm_del_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	cdev_del(&chip->cdev);
-	device_unregister(&chip->dev);
+	device_del(&chip->dev);
 }
 
 static int tpm1_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip)
@@ -222,7 +229,7 @@
 
 	tpm_add_ppi(chip);
 
-	rc = tpm_dev_add_device(chip);
+	rc = tpm_add_char_device(chip);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_err;
 
@@ -274,6 +281,6 @@
 		sysfs_remove_link(&chip->pdev->kobj, "ppi");
 
 	tpm1_chip_unregister(chip);
-	tpm_dev_del_device(chip);
+	tpm_del_char_device(chip);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_unregister);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 542a80c..28b477e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -128,13 +128,6 @@
 	TPM2_SU_STATE	= 0x0001,
 };
 
-enum tpm2_start_method {
-	TPM2_START_ACPI = 2,
-	TPM2_START_FIFO = 6,
-	TPM2_START_CRB = 7,
-	TPM2_START_CRB_WITH_ACPI = 8,
-};
-
 struct tpm_chip;
 
 struct tpm_vendor_specific {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 45a6340..b28e4da 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@
 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 
 enum tpm2_object_attributes {
-	TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH	= BIT(6),
+	TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH		= BIT(6),
+};
+
+enum tpm2_session_attributes {
+	TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION	= BIT(0),
 };
 
 struct tpm2_startup_in {
@@ -478,22 +482,18 @@
 	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);
 
 	/* public */
-	if (options->policydigest)
-		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->digest_len);
-	else
-		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14);
-
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
 
 	/* policy */
-	if (options->policydigest) {
+	if (options->policydigest_len) {
 		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
-		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->digest_len);
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
 		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
-			       options->digest_len);
+			       options->policydigest_len);
 	} else {
-		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH);
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
 	}
 
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@
 			     options->policyhandle ?
 			     options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW,
 			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
-			     0 /* session_attributes */,
+			     TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
 			     options->blobauth /* hmac */,
 			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
index 8342cf5..a12b319 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
@@ -34,14 +34,6 @@
 	CRB_ACPI_START_INDEX = 1,
 };
 
-struct acpi_tpm2 {
-	struct acpi_table_header hdr;
-	u16 platform_class;
-	u16 reserved;
-	u64 control_area_pa;
-	u32 start_method;
-} __packed;
-
 enum crb_ca_request {
 	CRB_CA_REQ_GO_IDLE	= BIT(0),
 	CRB_CA_REQ_CMD_READY	= BIT(1),
@@ -85,6 +77,8 @@
 
 struct crb_priv {
 	unsigned int flags;
+	struct resource res;
+	void __iomem *iobase;
 	struct crb_control_area __iomem *cca;
 	u8 __iomem *cmd;
 	u8 __iomem *rsp;
@@ -97,7 +91,7 @@
 	struct crb_priv *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
 	u8 sts = 0;
 
-	if ((le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->start)) & CRB_START_INVOKE) !=
+	if ((ioread32(&priv->cca->start) & CRB_START_INVOKE) !=
 	    CRB_START_INVOKE)
 		sts |= CRB_STS_COMPLETE;
 
@@ -113,7 +107,7 @@
 	if (count < 6)
 		return -EIO;
 
-	if (le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->sts)) & CRB_CA_STS_ERROR)
+	if (ioread32(&priv->cca->sts) & CRB_CA_STS_ERROR)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 6);
@@ -149,11 +143,11 @@
 	struct crb_priv *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (len > le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size))) {
+	if (len > ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size)) {
 		dev_err(&chip->dev,
 			"invalid command count value %x %zx\n",
 			(unsigned int) len,
-			(size_t) le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size)));
+			(size_t) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
 		return -E2BIG;
 	}
 
@@ -189,7 +183,7 @@
 static bool crb_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
 {
 	struct crb_priv *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
-	u32 cancel = le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->cancel));
+	u32 cancel = ioread32(&priv->cca->cancel);
 
 	return (cancel & CRB_CANCEL_INVOKE) == CRB_CANCEL_INVOKE;
 }
@@ -204,92 +198,23 @@
 	.req_complete_val = CRB_STS_COMPLETE,
 };
 
-static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
+static int crb_init(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
-	struct acpi_tpm2 *buf;
-	struct crb_priv *priv;
-	struct device *dev = &device->dev;
-	acpi_status status;
-	u32 sm;
-	u64 pa;
 	int rc;
 
-	status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1,
-				(struct acpi_table_header **) &buf);
-	if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
-		dev_err(dev, "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n");
-		return -ENODEV;
-	}
-
-	/* Should the FIFO driver handle this? */
-	if (buf->start_method == TPM2_START_FIFO)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_crb);
+	chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(&device->dev, &tpm_crb);
 	if (IS_ERR(chip))
 		return PTR_ERR(chip);
 
-	chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
-
-	if (buf->hdr.length < sizeof(struct acpi_tpm2)) {
-		dev_err(dev, "TPM2 ACPI table has wrong size");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	priv = (struct crb_priv *) devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(struct crb_priv),
-						GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!priv) {
-		dev_err(dev, "failed to devm_kzalloc for private data\n");
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
-	sm = le32_to_cpu(buf->start_method);
-
-	/* The reason for the extra quirk is that the PTT in 4th Gen Core CPUs
-	 * report only ACPI start but in practice seems to require both
-	 * ACPI start and CRB start.
-	 */
-	if (sm == TPM2_START_CRB || sm == TPM2_START_FIFO ||
-	    !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(device), "MSFT0101"))
-		priv->flags |= CRB_FL_CRB_START;
-
-	if (sm == TPM2_START_ACPI || sm == TPM2_START_CRB_WITH_ACPI)
-		priv->flags |= CRB_FL_ACPI_START;
-
-	priv->cca = (struct crb_control_area __iomem *)
-		devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, buf->control_area_pa, 0x1000);
-	if (!priv->cca) {
-		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the control area failed\n");
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
-	pa = ((u64) le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_high)) << 32) |
-		(u64) le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_low));
-	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
-					 ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
-	if (!priv->cmd) {
-		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the command buffer failed\n");
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
-	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
-	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
-					 ioread32(&priv->cca->rsp_size));
-	if (!priv->rsp) {
-		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the response buffer failed\n");
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
 	chip->vendor.priv = priv;
+	chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle;
+	chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
 
 	rc = tpm_get_timeouts(chip);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle;
-
 	rc = tpm2_do_selftest(chip);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -297,16 +222,133 @@
 	return tpm_chip_register(chip);
 }
 
+static int crb_check_resource(struct acpi_resource *ares, void *data)
+{
+	struct crb_priv *priv = data;
+	struct resource res;
+
+	if (acpi_dev_resource_memory(ares, &res)) {
+		priv->res = res;
+		priv->res.name = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void __iomem *crb_map_res(struct device *dev, struct crb_priv *priv,
+				 u64 start, u32 size)
+{
+	struct resource new_res = {
+		.start	= start,
+		.end	= start + size - 1,
+		.flags	= IORESOURCE_MEM,
+	};
+
+	/* Detect a 64 bit address on a 32 bit system */
+	if (start != new_res.start)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (!resource_contains(&priv->res, &new_res))
+		return devm_ioremap_resource(dev, &new_res);
+
+	return priv->iobase + (new_res.start - priv->res.start);
+}
+
+static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
+		      struct acpi_table_tpm2 *buf)
+{
+	struct list_head resources;
+	struct device *dev = &device->dev;
+	u64 pa;
+	int ret;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resources);
+	ret = acpi_dev_get_resources(device, &resources, crb_check_resource,
+				     priv);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&resources);
+
+	if (resource_type(&priv->res) != IORESOURCE_MEM) {
+		dev_err(dev,
+			FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table does not define a memory resource\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	priv->iobase = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, &priv->res);
+	if (IS_ERR(priv->iobase))
+		return PTR_ERR(priv->iobase);
+
+	priv->cca = crb_map_res(dev, priv, buf->control_address, 0x1000);
+	if (IS_ERR(priv->cca))
+		return PTR_ERR(priv->cca);
+
+	pa = ((u64) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_high) << 32) |
+	      (u64) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_low);
+	priv->cmd = crb_map_res(dev, priv, pa, ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
+	if (IS_ERR(priv->cmd))
+		return PTR_ERR(priv->cmd);
+
+	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
+	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
+	priv->rsp = crb_map_res(dev, priv, pa, ioread32(&priv->cca->rsp_size));
+	return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(priv->rsp);
+}
+
+static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
+{
+	struct acpi_table_tpm2 *buf;
+	struct crb_priv *priv;
+	struct device *dev = &device->dev;
+	acpi_status status;
+	u32 sm;
+	int rc;
+
+	status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1,
+				(struct acpi_table_header **) &buf);
+	if (ACPI_FAILURE(status) || buf->header.length < sizeof(*buf)) {
+		dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Should the FIFO driver handle this? */
+	sm = buf->start_method;
+	if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(struct crb_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!priv)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* The reason for the extra quirk is that the PTT in 4th Gen Core CPUs
+	 * report only ACPI start but in practice seems to require both
+	 * ACPI start and CRB start.
+	 */
+	if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER || sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED ||
+	    !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(device), "MSFT0101"))
+		priv->flags |= CRB_FL_CRB_START;
+
+	if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_START_METHOD ||
+	    sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_START_METHOD)
+		priv->flags |= CRB_FL_ACPI_START;
+
+	rc = crb_map_io(device, priv, buf);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return crb_init(device, priv);
+}
+
 static int crb_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device)
 {
 	struct device *dev = &device->dev;
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 
-	tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
-
 	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
 		tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
 
+	tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
index bd72fb0..4e6940a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@
 {
 	struct tcpa_event *event = v;
 	struct tcpa_event temp_event;
-	char *tempPtr;
+	char *temp_ptr;
 	int i;
 
 	memcpy(&temp_event, event, sizeof(struct tcpa_event));
@@ -242,10 +242,16 @@
 	temp_event.event_type = do_endian_conversion(event->event_type);
 	temp_event.event_size = do_endian_conversion(event->event_size);
 
-	tempPtr = (char *)&temp_event;
+	temp_ptr = (char *) &temp_event;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + temp_event.event_size; i++)
-		seq_putc(m, tempPtr[i]);
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(struct tcpa_event) - 1) ; i++)
+		seq_putc(m, temp_ptr[i]);
+
+	temp_ptr = (char *) v;
+
+	for (i = (sizeof(struct tcpa_event) - 1);
+	     i < (sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + temp_event.event_size); i++)
+		seq_putc(m, temp_ptr[i]);
 
 	return 0;
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index 8a3509c..a507006 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
 #include <linux/wait.h>
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
-#include <acpi/actbl2.h>
 #include "tpm.h"
 
 enum tis_access {
@@ -60,22 +59,18 @@
 };
 
 enum tis_defaults {
-	TIS_MEM_BASE = 0xFED40000,
 	TIS_MEM_LEN = 0x5000,
 	TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT = 750,	/* ms */
 	TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT = 2000,	/* 2 sec */
 };
 
 struct tpm_info {
-	unsigned long start;
-	unsigned long len;
-	unsigned int irq;
-};
-
-static struct tpm_info tis_default_info = {
-	.start = TIS_MEM_BASE,
-	.len = TIS_MEM_LEN,
-	.irq = 0,
+	struct resource res;
+	/* irq > 0 means: use irq $irq;
+	 * irq = 0 means: autoprobe for an irq;
+	 * irq = -1 means: no irq support
+	 */
+	int irq;
 };
 
 /* Some timeout values are needed before it is known whether the chip is
@@ -118,39 +113,11 @@
 {
 	return has_hid(dev, "INTC0102");
 }
-
-static inline int is_fifo(struct acpi_device *dev)
-{
-	struct acpi_table_tpm2 *tbl;
-	acpi_status st;
-
-	/* TPM 1.2 FIFO */
-	if (!has_hid(dev, "MSFT0101"))
-		return 1;
-
-	st = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1,
-			    (struct acpi_table_header **) &tbl);
-	if (ACPI_FAILURE(st)) {
-		dev_err(&dev->dev, "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n");
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (le32_to_cpu(tbl->start_method) != TPM2_START_FIFO)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* TPM 2.0 FIFO */
-	return 1;
-}
 #else
 static inline int is_itpm(struct acpi_device *dev)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-
-static inline int is_fifo(struct acpi_device *dev)
-{
-	return 1;
-}
 #endif
 
 /* Before we attempt to access the TPM we must see that the valid bit is set.
@@ -716,9 +683,9 @@
 	chip->acpi_dev_handle = acpi_dev_handle;
 #endif
 
-	chip->vendor.iobase = devm_ioremap(dev, tpm_info->start, tpm_info->len);
-	if (!chip->vendor.iobase)
-		return -EIO;
+	chip->vendor.iobase = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, &tpm_info->res);
+	if (IS_ERR(chip->vendor.iobase))
+		return PTR_ERR(chip->vendor.iobase);
 
 	/* Maximum timeouts */
 	chip->vendor.timeout_a = TIS_TIMEOUT_A_MAX;
@@ -807,7 +774,7 @@
 	/* INTERRUPT Setup */
 	init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.read_queue);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.int_queue);
-	if (interrupts) {
+	if (interrupts && tpm_info->irq != -1) {
 		if (tpm_info->irq) {
 			tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, IRQF_SHARED,
 						 tpm_info->irq);
@@ -893,29 +860,29 @@
 
 static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(tpm_tis_pm, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_tis_resume);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
 static int tpm_tis_pnp_init(struct pnp_dev *pnp_dev,
-				      const struct pnp_device_id *pnp_id)
+			    const struct pnp_device_id *pnp_id)
 {
-	struct tpm_info tpm_info = tis_default_info;
+	struct tpm_info tpm_info = {};
 	acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle = NULL;
+	struct resource *res;
 
-	tpm_info.start = pnp_mem_start(pnp_dev, 0);
-	tpm_info.len = pnp_mem_len(pnp_dev, 0);
+	res = pnp_get_resource(pnp_dev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
+	if (!res)
+		return -ENODEV;
+	tpm_info.res = *res;
 
 	if (pnp_irq_valid(pnp_dev, 0))
 		tpm_info.irq = pnp_irq(pnp_dev, 0);
 	else
-		interrupts = false;
+		tpm_info.irq = -1;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
 	if (pnp_acpi_device(pnp_dev)) {
 		if (is_itpm(pnp_acpi_device(pnp_dev)))
 			itpm = true;
 
-		acpi_dev_handle = pnp_acpi_device(pnp_dev)->handle;
+		acpi_dev_handle = ACPI_HANDLE(&pnp_dev->dev);
 	}
-#endif
 
 	return tpm_tis_init(&pnp_dev->dev, &tpm_info, acpi_dev_handle);
 }
@@ -956,7 +923,6 @@
 module_param_string(hid, tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id,
 		    sizeof(tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id), 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(hid, "Set additional specific HID for this driver to probe");
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
 static int tpm_check_resource(struct acpi_resource *ares, void *data)
@@ -964,11 +930,11 @@
 	struct tpm_info *tpm_info = (struct tpm_info *) data;
 	struct resource res;
 
-	if (acpi_dev_resource_interrupt(ares, 0, &res)) {
+	if (acpi_dev_resource_interrupt(ares, 0, &res))
 		tpm_info->irq = res.start;
-	} else if (acpi_dev_resource_memory(ares, &res)) {
-		tpm_info->start = res.start;
-		tpm_info->len = resource_size(&res);
+	else if (acpi_dev_resource_memory(ares, &res)) {
+		tpm_info->res = res;
+		tpm_info->res.name = NULL;
 	}
 
 	return 1;
@@ -976,14 +942,25 @@
 
 static int tpm_tis_acpi_init(struct acpi_device *acpi_dev)
 {
+	struct acpi_table_tpm2 *tbl;
+	acpi_status st;
 	struct list_head resources;
-	struct tpm_info tpm_info = tis_default_info;
+	struct tpm_info tpm_info = {};
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!is_fifo(acpi_dev))
+	st = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1,
+			    (struct acpi_table_header **) &tbl);
+	if (ACPI_FAILURE(st) || tbl->header.length < sizeof(*tbl)) {
+		dev_err(&acpi_dev->dev,
+			FW_BUG "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (tbl->start_method != ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resources);
+	tpm_info.irq = -1;
 	ret = acpi_dev_get_resources(acpi_dev, &resources, tpm_check_resource,
 				     &tpm_info);
 	if (ret < 0)
@@ -991,8 +968,11 @@
 
 	acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&resources);
 
-	if (!tpm_info.irq)
-		interrupts = false;
+	if (resource_type(&tpm_info.res) != IORESOURCE_MEM) {
+		dev_err(&acpi_dev->dev,
+			FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table does not define a memory resource\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (is_itpm(acpi_dev))
 		itpm = true;
@@ -1031,80 +1011,135 @@
 };
 #endif
 
+static struct platform_device *force_pdev;
+
+static int tpm_tis_plat_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct tpm_info tpm_info = {};
+	struct resource *res;
+
+	res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
+	if (res == NULL) {
+		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no memory resource defined\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+	tpm_info.res = *res;
+
+	res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_IRQ, 0);
+	if (res) {
+		tpm_info.irq = res->start;
+	} else {
+		if (pdev == force_pdev)
+			tpm_info.irq = -1;
+		else
+			/* When forcing auto probe the IRQ */
+			tpm_info.irq = 0;
+	}
+
+	return tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, &tpm_info, NULL);
+}
+
+static int tpm_tis_plat_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(&pdev->dev);
+
+	tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
+	tpm_tis_remove(chip);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static struct platform_driver tis_drv = {
+	.probe = tpm_tis_plat_probe,
+	.remove = tpm_tis_plat_remove,
 	.driver = {
 		.name		= "tpm_tis",
 		.pm		= &tpm_tis_pm,
 	},
 };
 
-static struct platform_device *pdev;
-
 static bool force;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
 module_param(force, bool, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(force, "Force device probe rather than using ACPI entry");
-static int __init init_tis(void)
+#endif
+
+static int tpm_tis_force_device(void)
 {
-	int rc;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
-	if (!force) {
-		rc = pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
-	}
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
-	if (!force) {
-		rc = acpi_bus_register_driver(&tis_acpi_driver);
-		if (rc) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
-			pnp_unregister_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
-#endif
-			return rc;
-		}
-	}
-#endif
+	struct platform_device *pdev;
+	static const struct resource x86_resources[] = {
+		{
+			.start = 0xFED40000,
+			.end = 0xFED40000 + TIS_MEM_LEN - 1,
+			.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM,
+		},
+	};
+
 	if (!force)
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		return rc;
-	pdev = platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(pdev)) {
-		rc = PTR_ERR(pdev);
-		goto err_dev;
-	}
-	rc = tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, &tis_default_info, NULL);
-	if (rc)
-		goto err_init;
+	/* The driver core will match the name tpm_tis of the device to
+	 * the tpm_tis platform driver and complete the setup via
+	 * tpm_tis_plat_probe
+	 */
+	pdev = platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, x86_resources,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(x86_resources));
+	if (IS_ERR(pdev))
+		return PTR_ERR(pdev);
+	force_pdev = pdev;
+
 	return 0;
-err_init:
-	platform_device_unregister(pdev);
-err_dev:
-	platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
+}
+
+static int __init init_tis(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_tis_force_device();
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_force;
+
+	rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_platform;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+	rc = acpi_bus_register_driver(&tis_acpi_driver);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_acpi;
+#endif
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PNP)) {
+		rc = pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err_pnp;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_pnp:
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+	acpi_bus_unregister_driver(&tis_acpi_driver);
+err_acpi:
+#endif
+	platform_device_unregister(force_pdev);
+err_platform:
+	if (force_pdev)
+		platform_device_unregister(force_pdev);
+err_force:
 	return rc;
 }
 
 static void __exit cleanup_tis(void)
 {
-	struct tpm_chip *chip;
-#if defined(CONFIG_PNP) || defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
-	if (!force) {
+	pnp_unregister_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
-		acpi_bus_unregister_driver(&tis_acpi_driver);
+	acpi_bus_unregister_driver(&tis_acpi_driver);
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
-		pnp_unregister_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
-#endif
-		return;
-	}
-#endif
-	chip = dev_get_drvdata(&pdev->dev);
-	tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
-	tpm_tis_remove(chip);
-	platform_device_unregister(pdev);
 	platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
+
+	if (force_pdev)
+		platform_device_unregister(force_pdev);
 }
 
 module_init(init_tis);
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index dcd4ac7..9bdf0ed 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
 #include <linux/oom.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -831,6 +832,97 @@
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
 
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+		     loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	loff_t i_size, pos;
+	ssize_t bytes = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+	if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
+		return -EFBIG;
+	if (i_size <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*buf = vmalloc(i_size);
+	if (!*buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	pos = 0;
+	while (pos < i_size) {
+		bytes = kernel_read(file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
+				    i_size - pos);
+		if (bytes < 0) {
+			ret = bytes;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (bytes == 0)
+			break;
+		pos += bytes;
+	}
+
+	if (pos != i_size) {
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
+	if (!ret)
+		*size = pos;
+
+out:
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		vfree(*buf);
+		*buf = NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
+
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+			       loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!path || !*path)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(file))
+		return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+	ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+	fput(file);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
+
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+			     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
+	int ret = -EBADF;
+
+	if (!f.file)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+out:
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd);
+
 ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
 {
 	ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 42cf2d9..4ea7e55 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
 	int pcrlock;
 	uint32_t hash;
-	uint32_t digest_len;
+	uint32_t policydigest_len;
 	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	uint32_t policyhandle;
 };
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index ae68100..e514f76 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2576,7 +2576,22 @@
 #endif
 extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 
+enum kernel_read_file_id {
+	READING_FIRMWARE = 1,
+	READING_MODULE,
+	READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
+	READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
+	READING_POLICY,
+	READING_MAX_ID
+};
+
 extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
+extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+			    enum kernel_read_file_id);
+extern int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+				      enum kernel_read_file_id);
+extern int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+				    enum kernel_read_file_id);
 extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
 extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 120ccc5..e6516cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@
 extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
-extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 
 #else
 static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -42,12 +43,13 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
+static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+				     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 71969de..cdee11c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -541,25 +541,24 @@
  *	@inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
  *	The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
  *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_fw_from_file:
- *	Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
- *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- *	the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
- *	was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
- *	by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
- *	@buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
- *	@size length of the firmware contents.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @kernel_module_request:
  *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
  *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
  *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
  *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_module_from_file:
- *	Load a kernel module from userspace.
- *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- *	the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
- *	this argument will be NULL.
+ * @kernel_read_file:
+ *	Read a file specified by userspace.
+ *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
+ *	by the kernel.
+ *	@id kernel read file identifier
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_post_read_file:
+ *	Read a file specified by userspace.
+ *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
+ *	by the kernel.
+ *	@buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents.
+ *	@size length of the file contents.
+ *	@id kernel read file identifier
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_fix_setuid:
  *	Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
@@ -1454,9 +1453,11 @@
 	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-	int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
 	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 	int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				int flags);
 	int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -1715,9 +1716,9 @@
 	struct list_head cred_transfer;
 	struct list_head kernel_act_as;
 	struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
-	struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
+	struct list_head kernel_read_file;
+	struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_request;
-	struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
 	struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
 	struct list_head task_setpgid;
 	struct list_head task_getpgid;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4824a4c..157f0cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 
 struct linux_binprm;
 struct cred;
@@ -298,9 +300,11 @@
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
 int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -850,18 +854,20 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file,
-					       char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+					    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file,
+						 char *buf, loff_t size,
+						 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 007b791..b696c3f 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -33,65 +34,6 @@
 
 static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image);
 
-static int copy_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, unsigned long *buf_len)
-{
-	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
-	int ret;
-	struct kstat stat;
-	loff_t pos;
-	ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
-	if (!f.file)
-		return -EBADF;
-
-	ret = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (stat.size > INT_MAX) {
-		ret = -EFBIG;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */
-	if (stat.size == 0) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	*buf = vmalloc(stat.size);
-	if (!*buf) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	pos = 0;
-	while (pos < stat.size) {
-		bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
-				    stat.size - pos);
-		if (bytes < 0) {
-			vfree(*buf);
-			ret = bytes;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
-		if (bytes == 0)
-			break;
-		pos += bytes;
-	}
-
-	if (pos != stat.size) {
-		ret = -EBADF;
-		vfree(*buf);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	*buf_len = pos;
-out:
-	fdput(f);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 /* Architectures can provide this probe function */
 int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 					 unsigned long buf_len)
@@ -182,16 +124,17 @@
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	void *ldata;
+	loff_t size;
 
-	ret = copy_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
-				&image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
+				       &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
+	image->kernel_buf_len = size;
 
 	/* Call arch image probe handlers */
 	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
 					    image->kernel_buf_len);
-
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -206,10 +149,12 @@
 #endif
 	/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
 	if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
-		ret = copy_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
-					&image->initrd_buf_len);
+		ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
+					       &size, INT_MAX,
+					       READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
+		image->initrd_buf_len = size;
 	}
 
 	if (cmdline_len) {
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 8358f46..9554109 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2654,7 +2654,7 @@
 	if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
 		return -ENOEXEC;
 
-	err = security_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+	err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -2672,63 +2672,6 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
-static int copy_module_from_fd(int fd, struct load_info *info)
-{
-	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
-	int err;
-	struct kstat stat;
-	loff_t pos;
-	ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
-	if (!f.file)
-		return -ENOEXEC;
-
-	err = security_kernel_module_from_file(f.file);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (stat.size > INT_MAX) {
-		err = -EFBIG;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */
-	if (stat.size == 0) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	info->hdr = vmalloc(stat.size);
-	if (!info->hdr) {
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	pos = 0;
-	while (pos < stat.size) {
-		bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(info->hdr) + pos,
-				    stat.size - pos);
-		if (bytes < 0) {
-			vfree(info->hdr);
-			err = bytes;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if (bytes == 0)
-			break;
-		pos += bytes;
-	}
-	info->len = pos;
-
-out:
-	fdput(f);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static void free_copy(struct load_info *info)
 {
 	vfree(info->hdr);
@@ -3589,8 +3532,10 @@
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
 {
-	int err;
 	struct load_info info = { };
+	loff_t size;
+	void *hdr;
+	int err;
 
 	err = may_init_module();
 	if (err)
@@ -3602,9 +3547,12 @@
 		      |MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	err = copy_module_from_fd(fd, &info);
+	err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX,
+				       READING_MODULE);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
+	info.hdr = hdr;
+	info.len = size;
 
 	return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 8f1ab37..345b759 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
 	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
 }
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
 	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 585af61..5d0f611 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
@@ -106,6 +108,8 @@
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 			      struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields,
 			      struct ima_digest_data *hash);
@@ -136,13 +140,25 @@
 	return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS);
 }
 
+enum ima_hooks {
+	FILE_CHECK = 1,
+	MMAP_CHECK,
+	BPRM_CHECK,
+	POST_SETATTR,
+	MODULE_CHECK,
+	FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+	KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+	KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
+	POLICY_CHECK,
+	MAX_CHECK
+};
+
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
-int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
-			    int *xattr_len);
+			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+			    enum hash_algo algo);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -157,8 +173,6 @@
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, FIRMWARE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
-
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		     int flags);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
@@ -178,23 +192,25 @@
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG	0x04
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES	0x08
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE	0x10
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY	0x20
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
+			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len, int opened);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-					   int func);
-void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
-		       struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+					   enum ima_hooks func);
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+				 int xattr_len);
 int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
 
 #else
-static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func,
+static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 					   struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename,
@@ -216,15 +232,16 @@
 }
 
 static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache
-							 *iint, int func)
+							 *iint,
+							 enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
-static inline void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-				     int xattr_len,
-				     struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+static inline enum hash_algo
+ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len)
 {
+	return ima_hash_algo;
 }
 
 static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 1d950fb..370e42d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #include "ima.h"
 
 /*
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
+ * @func: caller identifier
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -168,13 +168,13 @@
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -188,9 +188,8 @@
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
-			    int *xattr_len)
+			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+			    enum hash_algo algo)
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -201,9 +200,6 @@
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
-	if (xattr_value)
-		*xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_path.dentry, xattr_value);
-
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
@@ -213,13 +209,10 @@
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		/* use default hash algorithm */
-		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		hash.hdr.algo = algo;
 
-		if (xattr_value)
-			ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len, &hash.hdr);
-
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+		result = (!buf) ?  ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
+			ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
 		if (!result) {
 			int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
 			void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 1873b55..6b4694a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -68,25 +67,25 @@
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-					   int func)
+					   enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		return iint->ima_mmap_status;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		return iint->ima_bprm_status;
-	case MODULE_CHECK:
-		return iint->ima_module_status;
-	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
-		return iint->ima_firmware_status;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
-	default:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
 		return iint->ima_file_status;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		return iint->ima_read_status;
 	}
 }
 
 static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-				 int func, enum integrity_status status)
+				 enum ima_hooks func,
+				 enum integrity_status status)
 {
 	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
@@ -95,20 +94,19 @@
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
 		break;
-	case MODULE_CHECK:
-		iint->ima_module_status = status;
-		break;
-	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
-		iint->ima_firmware_status = status;
-		break;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
-	default:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
 		iint->ima_file_status = status;
 		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		iint->ima_read_status = status;
+		break;
 	}
 }
 
-static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
+static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
@@ -117,49 +115,51 @@
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
 		break;
-	case MODULE_CHECK:
-		iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
-		break;
-	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
-		iint->flags |= (IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
-		break;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
-	default:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
 		iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
 		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_READ_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
 	}
 }
 
-void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
-		       struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+				 int xattr_len)
 {
 	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
 
 	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
-		return;
+		/* return default hash algo */
+		return ima_hash_algo;
 
 	switch (xattr_value->type) {
 	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
 		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
 		if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig))
-			return;
-		hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+			return ima_hash_algo;
+		return sig->hash_algo;
 		break;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
-		hash->algo = xattr_value->digest[0];
+		return xattr_value->digest[0];
 		break;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
 		/* this is for backward compatibility */
 		if (xattr_len == 21) {
 			unsigned int zero = 0;
 			if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4))
-				hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+				return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
 			else
-				hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+				return HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 		} else if (xattr_len == 17)
-			hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+			return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
 		break;
 	}
+
+	/* return default hash algo */
+	return ima_hash_algo;
 }
 
 int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -182,7 +182,8 @@
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
-int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
+			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len, int opened)
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
 		return;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, NULL);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 6eb6293..38f2ed8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #include "ima.h"
 
 struct ahash_completion {
@@ -519,6 +519,124 @@
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+				  struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				  struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+{
+	struct ahash_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	struct ahash_completion res;
+	int rc, ahash_rc = 0;
+
+	hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	init_completion(&res.completion);
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+				   ahash_complete, &res);
+
+	rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	sg_init_one(&sg, buf, len);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len);
+
+	ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+
+	/* wait for the update request to complete */
+	rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+	if (!rc) {
+		ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0);
+		rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res);
+	}
+out:
+	ahash_request_free(req);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int calc_buffer_ahash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+			     struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_atfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	rc = calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_atfm(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int calc_buffer_shash_tfm(const void *buf, loff_t size,
+				struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+	unsigned int len;
+	int rc;
+
+	shash->tfm = tfm;
+	shash->flags = 0;
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	while (size) {
+		len = size < PAGE_SIZE ? size : PAGE_SIZE;
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, len);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		buf += len;
+		size -= len;
+	}
+
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, hash->digest);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int calc_buffer_shash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+			     struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	rc = calc_buffer_shash_tfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+			 struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (ima_ahash_minsize && len >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
+		rc = calc_buffer_ahash(buf, len, hash);
+		if (!rc)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	return calc_buffer_shash(buf, len, hash);
+}
+
 static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 {
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index f355231..60d011a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -258,6 +259,43 @@
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
+static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
+{
+	void *data;
+	char *datap;
+	loff_t size;
+	int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
+
+	char *p;
+
+	/* remove \n */
+	datap = path;
+	strsep(&datap, "\n");
+
+	rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	datap = data;
+	while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
+		pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
+		rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			break;
+		size -= rc;
+	}
+
+	vfree(data);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+	else if (size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else
+		return pathlen;
+}
+
 static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -286,9 +324,20 @@
 	result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
 	if (result < 0)
 		goto out_free;
-	result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
-	mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
 
+	if (data[0] == '/') {
+		result = ima_read_policy(data);
+	} else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
+		pr_err("IMA: signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+				    "policy_update", "signed policy required",
+				    1, 0);
+		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+			result = -EACCES;
+	} else {
+		result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
 out_free:
 	kfree(data);
 out:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index bd79f25..5d679a6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #include "ima.h"
 
 /* name for boot aggregate entry */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9d96551..391f417 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -154,8 +153,8 @@
 	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
-			       int opened)
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -163,9 +162,10 @@
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 	bool violation_check;
+	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
-	violation_check = ((function == FILE_CHECK || function == MMAP_CHECK) &&
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func);
+	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
 		return 0;
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
 
 	/*  Is the appraise rule hook specific?  */
 	if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
-		function = FILE_CHECK;
+		func = FILE_CHECK;
 
 	inode_lock(inode);
 
@@ -214,16 +214,19 @@
 	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
 	if (!action) {
 		if (must_appraise)
-			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
+			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func);
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
 	template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
 	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
 		    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
-		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+		/* read 'security.ima' */
+		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_path.dentry, &xattr_value);
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
+	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
 	if (rc != 0) {
 		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
 			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
@@ -237,7 +240,7 @@
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
 				      xattr_value, xattr_len);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname,
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
 					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
@@ -270,7 +273,8 @@
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
-		return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+		return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+					   MMAP_CHECK, 0);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -289,7 +293,8 @@
  */
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+				   BPRM_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -304,24 +309,26 @@
  */
 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
 {
-	return process_measurement(file,
+	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
 				   FILE_CHECK, opened);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
 /**
- * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
- * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
+ * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
  *
- * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
+ * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
+ * in terms of the policy identifier.  Appraising the integrity of
+ * a file requires a file descriptor.
  *
- * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
- * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
+int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
-	if (!file) {
+	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
 #ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
 		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
@@ -329,18 +336,53 @@
 #endif
 		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+	[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+	[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
+	[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+	[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
+	[READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
+};
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy.  Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
-	if (!file) {
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+
+	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
 		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
 		return 0;
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
+
+	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
+		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+			return -EACCES;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+	return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0a3b781..be09e2c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@
 	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 };
 
 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
@@ -127,6 +129,10 @@
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+	.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
 	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
 #else
@@ -207,8 +213,8 @@
  *
  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  */
-static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
-			    struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
+			    enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -289,7 +295,7 @@
  * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
  * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
  */
-static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
+static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
 		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
@@ -299,13 +305,12 @@
 		return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
-	case MODULE_CHECK:
-		return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
-	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
-		return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
-	default:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
 		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
+	case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+	default:
+		return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -411,13 +416,16 @@
 	for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
 		list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
 			      &ima_default_rules);
+		if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
+			temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
 	}
 
 	ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
+	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
 
 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
-int ima_check_policy()
+int ima_check_policy(void)
 {
 	if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -612,6 +620,14 @@
 				entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
+				 0)
+				entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
+				 == 0)
+				entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)
@@ -770,6 +786,8 @@
 		temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
 	else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
 		temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
+	else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
+		temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
 	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 	return result;
@@ -855,7 +873,9 @@
 
 enum {
 	func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
-	func_module, func_firmware, func_post
+	func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
+	func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
+	func_policy
 };
 
 static char *func_tokens[] = {
@@ -864,6 +884,9 @@
 	"BPRM_CHECK",
 	"MODULE_CHECK",
 	"FIRMWARE_CHECK",
+	"KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
+	"KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
+	"POLICY_CHECK",
 	"POST_SETATTR"
 };
 
@@ -903,6 +926,49 @@
 #define mt(token)	mask_tokens[token]
 #define ft(token)	func_tokens[token]
 
+/*
+ * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
+ */
+static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	char tbuf[64] = {0,};
+
+	switch (func) {
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
+		break;
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
+		break;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
+		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
+		break;
+	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
+		break;
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
+		break;
+	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_kernel));
+		break;
+	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
+		break;
+	case POLICY_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
+		break;
+	default:
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
+		break;
+	}
+	seq_puts(m, " ");
+}
+
 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
@@ -924,33 +990,8 @@
 
 	seq_puts(m, " ");
 
-	if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) {
-		switch (entry->func) {
-		case FILE_CHECK:
-			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
-			break;
-		case MMAP_CHECK:
-			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
-			break;
-		case BPRM_CHECK:
-			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
-			break;
-		case MODULE_CHECK:
-			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
-			break;
-		case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
-			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
-			break;
-		case POST_SETATTR:
-			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
-			break;
-		default:
-			snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->func);
-			seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
-			break;
-		}
-		seq_puts(m, " ");
-	}
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
+		policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
 
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
 		if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 0b7404e..febd12e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
-
 #include "ima.h"
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 2934e3d..f9bae04 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
  * File: ima_template_lib.c
  *      Library of supported template fields.
  */
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index c7708d9..e08935c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -45,16 +45,12 @@
 #define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED	0x00000800
 #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE	0x00001000
 #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00002000
-#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE	0x00004000
-#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED	0x00008000
-#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE	0x00010000
-#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED	0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00004000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00008000
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE)
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
 #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED)
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
 
 enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -109,8 +105,7 @@
 	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
 	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
 };
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 0dcab20..90d6175 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -744,6 +744,7 @@
 	unsigned long handle;
 	unsigned long lock;
 	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	unsigned int digest_len;
 	int i;
 	int tpm2;
 
@@ -752,7 +753,6 @@
 		return tpm2;
 
 	opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-	opt->digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
 
 	while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
 		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
@@ -812,8 +812,6 @@
 			for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
 				if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
 					opt->hash = i;
-					opt->digest_len =
-						hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
 					break;
 				}
 			}
@@ -825,13 +823,14 @@
 			}
 			break;
 		case Opt_policydigest:
-			if (!tpm2 ||
-			    strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * opt->digest_len))
+			digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+			if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
 				return -EINVAL;
 			res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
-				      opt->digest_len);
+				      digest_len);
 			if (res < 0)
 				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
 			break;
 		case Opt_policyhandle:
 			if (!tpm2)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e8ffd92..3644b034 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -884,31 +884,33 @@
 	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
 }
 
-int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_fw_from_file, 0, file, buf, size);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file);
-
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
 }
 
-int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_from_file, 0, file);
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	return ima_module_check(file);
+	return ima_read_file(file, id);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
+
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
@@ -1691,12 +1693,12 @@
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as),
 	.kernel_create_files_as =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as),
-	.kernel_fw_from_file =
-		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_fw_from_file),
 	.kernel_module_request =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
-	.kernel_module_from_file =
-		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file),
+	.kernel_read_file =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_read_file),
+	.kernel_post_read_file =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_post_read_file),
 	.task_fix_setuid =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_fix_setuid),
 	.task_setpgid =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setpgid),
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index ad5cd76..3411c33 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
 
-ccflags-y := -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
+ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
 
 $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2d6e9bd..11f7901 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1442,9 +1442,13 @@
 	 * Don't do anything special for these.
 	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
 	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
-	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC
 	 */
-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		struct super_block *sbp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_sb;
+		struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+
+		isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
 		isp->smk_task = NULL;
 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
 		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
@@ -1545,12 +1549,8 @@
  * File Hooks
  */
 
-/**
- * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
- * @file: unused
- * @mask: unused
- *
- * Returns 0
+/*
+ * There is no smack_file_permission hook
  *
  * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
  * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
@@ -1559,10 +1559,6 @@
  * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
  * label changing that SELinux does.
  */
-static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 
 /**
  * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
@@ -4503,16 +4499,10 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
- * @vrule: rule to be freed.
- *
+/*
+ * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
  * No memory was allocated.
  */
-static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
-{
-	/* No-op */
-}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
@@ -4563,16 +4553,11 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
- * @secdata: unused
- * @seclen: unused
- *
- * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
+/*
+ * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
+ * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
+ * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
  */
-static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
-{
-}
 
 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
@@ -4631,7 +4616,6 @@
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
 
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, smack_file_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
@@ -4726,13 +4710,11 @@
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, smack_audit_rule_free),
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),