| .. _securitybugs: |
| |
| Security bugs |
| ============= |
| |
| Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd |
| like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and |
| disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the |
| Linux kernel security team. |
| |
| Contact |
| ------- |
| |
| The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at |
| <security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers |
| who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix. |
| If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as |
| that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the |
| security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to |
| understand and fix the security vulnerability. |
| |
| As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it |
| will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in |
| admin-guide/reporting-bugs.rst if you are unclear about what |
| information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not |
| be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been |
| made public. |
| |
| Disclosure |
| ---------- |
| |
| The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the |
| bug submitter to bug resolution as well as disclosure. We prefer |
| to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible. It is reasonable to |
| delay disclosure when the bug or the fix is not yet fully understood, |
| the solution is not well-tested or for vendor coordination. However, we |
| expect these delays to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months. |
| A disclosure date is negotiated by the security team working with the |
| bug submitter as well as vendors. However, the kernel security team |
| holds the final say when setting a disclosure date. The timeframe for |
| disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known) |
| to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to |
| disclosure date to be on the order of 7 days. |
| |
| Coordination |
| ------------ |
| |
| Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege |
| escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private |
| <linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors |
| are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the |
| upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and |
| will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update |
| publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate, |
| the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can |
| include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix |
| the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki: |
| <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists> |
| |
| CVE assignment |
| -------------- |
| |
| The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them |
| for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and |
| may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier |
| assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private |
| linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known |
| before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit |
| message, though. |
| |
| Non-disclosure agreements |
| ------------------------- |
| |
| The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable |
| to enter any non-disclosure agreements. |