| /* | |
| * Intel Memory Protection Keys management | |
| * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation. | |
| * | |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
| * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, | |
| * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation. | |
| * | |
| * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT | |
| * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or | |
| * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for | |
| * more details. | |
| */ | |
| #include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */ | |
| #include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */ | |
| #include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */ | |
| #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h> | |
| #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */ | |
| #include <asm/mmu_context.h> /* vma_pkey() */ | |
| #include <asm/fpu/internal.h> /* fpregs_active() */ | |
| int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm) | |
| { | |
| bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false; | |
| int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey; | |
| int ret; | |
| /* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */ | |
| if (execute_only_pkey == -1) { | |
| /* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */ | |
| execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm); | |
| if (execute_only_pkey < 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| need_to_set_mm_pkey = true; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * We do not want to go through the relatively costly | |
| * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to. Check it | |
| * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is | |
| * write-disabled that we do not have to set it | |
| * ourselves. We need preempt off so that nobody | |
| * can make fpregs inactive. | |
| */ | |
| preempt_disable(); | |
| if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey && | |
| fpregs_active() && | |
| !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) { | |
| preempt_enable(); | |
| return execute_only_pkey; | |
| } | |
| preempt_enable(); | |
| /* | |
| * Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything | |
| * other than execution. | |
| */ | |
| ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey, | |
| PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS); | |
| /* | |
| * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return | |
| * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support. | |
| */ | |
| if (ret) { | |
| mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */ | |
| if (need_to_set_mm_pkey) | |
| mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey; | |
| return execute_only_pkey; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma) | |
| { | |
| /* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */ | |
| if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC) | |
| return false; | |
| if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey) | |
| return false; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls. | |
| */ | |
| int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never | |
| * override the value that came from the user. | |
| */ | |
| if (pkey != -1) | |
| return pkey; | |
| /* | |
| * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping | |
| * which is now being given permissions that are not | |
| * execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey. | |
| */ | |
| if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) && | |
| (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the | |
| * execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that, | |
| * fall through as if we do not have execute-only | |
| * support. | |
| */ | |
| if (prot == PROT_EXEC) { | |
| pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm); | |
| if (pkey > 0) | |
| return pkey; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to | |
| * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we | |
| * are working on. | |
| */ | |
| return vma_pkey(vma); | |
| } | |
| #define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey) (PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY)) | |
| /* | |
| * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive | |
| * as possible. This ensures that any threads clone()'d early | |
| * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access | |
| * to data which is pkey-protected later on. | |
| */ | |
| u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) | | |
| PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) | | |
| PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) | | |
| PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) | | |
| PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15); | |
| /* | |
| * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU | |
| * registers. This is called from a very specific context where | |
| * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU | |
| * directly. The fact that PKRU is only available when we are | |
| * using eagerfpu mode makes this possible. | |
| */ | |
| void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void) | |
| { | |
| u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value); | |
| /* | |
| * Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init | |
| * state' which increases context switch cost. Avoid | |
| * writing 0 when PKRU was already 0. | |
| */ | |
| if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru()) | |
| return; | |
| /* | |
| * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate' | |
| * with the baseline from the process. | |
| */ | |
| write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot); | |
| } | |
| static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, | |
| size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | |
| { | |
| char buf[32]; | |
| unsigned int len; | |
| len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value); | |
| return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len); | |
| } | |
| static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file, | |
| const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | |
| { | |
| char buf[32]; | |
| ssize_t len; | |
| u32 new_init_pkru; | |
| len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1); | |
| if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len)) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| /* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */ | |
| buf[len] = '\0'; | |
| if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru)) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| /* | |
| * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system | |
| * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access | |
| * or writes to pkey 0. | |
| */ | |
| if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT)) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); | |
| return count; | |
| } | |
| static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = { | |
| .read = init_pkru_read_file, | |
| .write = init_pkru_write_file, | |
| .llseek = default_llseek, | |
| }; | |
| static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void) | |
| { | |
| debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, | |
| arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value); | |
| static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt) | |
| { | |
| u32 new_init_pkru; | |
| if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru)) | |
| return 1; | |
| WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru); |