| Here documents known IPsec corner cases which need to be keep in mind when | |
| deploy various IPsec configuration in real world production environment. | |
| 1. IPcomp: Small IP packet won't get compressed at sender, and failed on | |
| policy check on receiver. | |
| Quote from RFC3173: | |
| 2.2. Non-Expansion Policy | |
| If the total size of a compressed payload and the IPComp header, as | |
| defined in section 3, is not smaller than the size of the original | |
| payload, the IP datagram MUST be sent in the original non-compressed | |
| form. To clarify: If an IP datagram is sent non-compressed, no | |
| IPComp header is added to the datagram. This policy ensures saving | |
| the decompression processing cycles and avoiding incurring IP | |
| datagram fragmentation when the expanded datagram is larger than the | |
| MTU. | |
| Small IP datagrams are likely to expand as a result of compression. | |
| Therefore, a numeric threshold should be applied before compression, | |
| where IP datagrams of size smaller than the threshold are sent in the | |
| original form without attempting compression. The numeric threshold | |
| is implementation dependent. | |
| Current IPComp implementation is indeed by the book, while as in practice | |
| when sending non-compressed packet to the peer(whether or not packet len | |
| is smaller than the threshold or the compressed len is large than original | |
| packet len), the packet is dropped when checking the policy as this packet | |
| matches the selector but not coming from any XFRM layer, i.e., with no | |
| security path. Such naked packet will not eventually make it to upper layer. | |
| The result is much more wired to the user when ping peer with different | |
| payload length. | |
| One workaround is try to set "level use" for each policy if user observed | |
| above scenario. The consequence of doing so is small packet(uncompressed) | |
| will skip policy checking on receiver side. |