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Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -08001/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
7 * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
8 *
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -07009 * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
10 *
11 * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
12 *
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080013 * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -070014 * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080015 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21/*
22 * USAGE:
23 * NOTES:
24 * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
25 * CONFIG_SECURITY=y
26 * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
27 * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
28 * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
29 * ISSUES:
30 * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
31 * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
32 * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
33 */
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080034#include <linux/kernel.h>
35#include <linux/init.h>
36#include <linux/security.h>
37#include <linux/types.h>
38#include <linux/netfilter.h>
39#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
40#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
Tejun Heo5a0e3ad2010-03-24 17:04:11 +090041#include <linux/slab.h>
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080042#include <linux/ip.h>
43#include <linux/tcp.h>
44#include <linux/skbuff.h>
45#include <linux/xfrm.h>
46#include <net/xfrm.h>
47#include <net/checksum.h>
48#include <net/udp.h>
Arun Sharma600634972011-07-26 16:09:06 -070049#include <linux/atomic.h>
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080050
51#include "avc.h"
52#include "objsec.h"
53#include "xfrm.h"
54
Paul Moored621d352008-01-29 08:43:36 -050055/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
56atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080057
58/*
Paul Moore4baabee2013-07-23 17:38:39 -040059 * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080060 */
61static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
62{
63 return (ctx &&
64 (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
65 (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
66}
67
68/*
Paul Moore4baabee2013-07-23 17:38:39 -040069 * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -080070 */
71static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
72{
73 return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
74}
75
76/*
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -040077 * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security
78 * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
79 */
80static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
81 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
82{
83 int rc;
84 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
85 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
86 u32 str_len;
87
88 if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL ||
89 uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM ||
90 uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
91 return -EINVAL;
92
93 str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
94 if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
95 return -ENOMEM;
96
97 ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
98 if (!ctx)
99 return -ENOMEM;
100
101 ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
102 ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
103 ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
104 memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
105 ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
106 rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid);
107 if (rc)
108 goto err;
109
110 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
111 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
112 if (rc)
113 goto err;
114
115 *ctxp = ctx;
116 atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
117 return 0;
118
119err:
120 kfree(ctx);
121 return rc;
122}
123
124/*
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400125 * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure.
126 */
127static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
128{
129 if (!ctx)
130 return;
131
132 atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
133 kfree(ctx);
134}
135
136/*
137 * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule.
138 */
139static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
140{
141 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
142
143 if (!ctx)
144 return 0;
145
146 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
147 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
148 NULL);
149}
150
151/*
Paul Moore4baabee2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400152 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
153 * rule.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800154 */
Paul Moore03e1ad72008-04-12 19:07:52 -0700155int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800156{
Venkat Yekkirala5b368e62006-10-05 15:42:18 -0500157 int rc;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800158
Paul Moore96484342013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400159 /* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
160 * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
161 if (!ctx)
Venkat Yekkirala5b368e62006-10-05 15:42:18 -0500162 return 0;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800163
Paul Moore96484342013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400164 /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
165 if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
166 return -EINVAL;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800167
Paul Moore96484342013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400168 rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
169 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
170 return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800171}
172
173/*
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700174 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
175 * the given policy, flow combo.
176 */
Paul Moore96484342013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400177int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
178 struct xfrm_policy *xp,
179 const struct flowi *fl)
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700180{
181 u32 state_sid;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700182
Venkat Yekkirala67f83cb2006-11-08 17:04:26 -0600183 if (!xp->security)
Venkat Yekkirala5b368e62006-10-05 15:42:18 -0500184 if (x->security)
185 /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
186 return 0;
187 else
188 /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
189 return 1;
Venkat Yekkirala67f83cb2006-11-08 17:04:26 -0600190 else
191 if (!x->security)
192 /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
193 return 0;
194 else
195 if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
196 /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
197 return 0;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700198
Venkat Yekkirala67f83cb2006-11-08 17:04:26 -0600199 state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700200
David S. Miller1d28f422011-03-12 00:29:39 -0500201 if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700202 return 0;
203
Paul Moore96484342013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400204 /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
205 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
206 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
207 return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
208 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
209 NULL) ? 0 : 1);
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700210}
211
Paul Moore817eff72013-12-10 14:57:54 -0500212static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
213{
214 struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
215 struct xfrm_state *x;
216
217 if (dst == NULL)
218 return SECSID_NULL;
219 x = dst->xfrm;
220 if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
221 return SECSID_NULL;
222
223 return x->security->ctx_sid;
224}
225
226static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
227 u32 *sid, int ckall)
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700228{
Paul Mooree2193692013-07-23 17:38:40 -0400229 u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
Paul Moore817eff72013-12-10 14:57:54 -0500230 struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700231
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700232 if (sp) {
Paul Mooree2193692013-07-23 17:38:40 -0400233 int i;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700234
Paul Mooree2193692013-07-23 17:38:40 -0400235 for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700236 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
237 if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
238 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
239
Paul Mooree2193692013-07-23 17:38:40 -0400240 if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) {
241 sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid;
Venkat Yekkiralabeb8d132006-08-04 23:12:42 -0700242 if (!ckall)
Paul Mooree2193692013-07-23 17:38:40 -0400243 goto out;
244 } else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) {
245 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700246 return -EINVAL;
Paul Mooree2193692013-07-23 17:38:40 -0400247 }
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700248 }
249 }
250 }
251
Paul Mooree2193692013-07-23 17:38:40 -0400252out:
253 *sid = sid_session;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700254 return 0;
255}
256
257/*
Paul Moore817eff72013-12-10 14:57:54 -0500258 * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
259 * incoming packet.
260 */
261int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
262{
263 if (skb == NULL) {
264 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
265 return 0;
266 }
267 return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
268}
269
270int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
271{
272 int rc;
273
274 rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
275 if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
276 *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
277
278 return rc;
279}
280
281/*
Paul Moore4baabee2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400282 * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800283 */
Paul Moore03e1ad72008-04-12 19:07:52 -0700284int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
285 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800286{
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400287 return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800288}
289
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800290/*
Paul Moore4baabee2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400291 * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new
292 * for policy cloning.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800293 */
Paul Moore03e1ad72008-04-12 19:07:52 -0700294int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
295 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800296{
Paul Moore03e1ad72008-04-12 19:07:52 -0700297 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800298
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400299 if (!old_ctx)
300 return 0;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800301
Duan Jiong7d1db4b2013-09-26 15:52:13 -0400302 new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
303 GFP_ATOMIC);
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400304 if (!new_ctx)
305 return -ENOMEM;
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400306 atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
307 *new_ctxp = new_ctx;
308
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800309 return 0;
310}
311
312/*
Paul Moore03e1ad72008-04-12 19:07:52 -0700313 * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800314 */
Paul Moore03e1ad72008-04-12 19:07:52 -0700315void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800316{
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400317 selinux_xfrm_free(ctx);
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800318}
319
320/*
Catherine Zhangc8c05a82006-06-08 23:39:49 -0700321 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
322 */
Paul Moore03e1ad72008-04-12 19:07:52 -0700323int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
Catherine Zhangc8c05a82006-06-08 23:39:49 -0700324{
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400325 return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx);
Catherine Zhangc8c05a82006-06-08 23:39:49 -0700326}
327
328/*
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400329 * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using
330 * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800331 */
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400332int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
333 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800334{
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400335 return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx);
336}
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800337
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400338/*
339 * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based
340 * on a secid.
341 */
342int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
343 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
344{
345 int rc;
346 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
347 char *ctx_str = NULL;
348 int str_len;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800349
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400350 if (!polsec)
351 return 0;
352
353 if (secid == 0)
354 return -EINVAL;
355
356 rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
357 if (rc)
358 return rc;
359
360 ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
Geyslan G. Bem0af90162013-12-04 16:10:24 -0500361 if (!ctx) {
362 rc = -ENOMEM;
363 goto out;
364 }
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400365
366 ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
367 ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
368 ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
369 ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
370 memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
Paul Moore2e5aa862013-07-23 17:38:38 -0400371
372 x->security = ctx;
373 atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
Geyslan G. Bem0af90162013-12-04 16:10:24 -0500374out:
375 kfree(ctx_str);
376 return rc;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800377}
378
379/*
380 * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
381 */
382void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
383{
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400384 selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800385}
386
Paul Moore4baabee2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400387/*
388 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
389 */
Catherine Zhangc8c05a82006-06-08 23:39:49 -0700390int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
391{
Paul Mooreccf17cc2013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400392 return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
Catherine Zhangc8c05a82006-06-08 23:39:49 -0700393}
394
Catherine Zhang2c7946a2006-03-20 22:41:23 -0800395/*
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800396 * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
397 * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
398 * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then
399 * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
400 * gone thru the IPSec process.
401 */
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400402int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
403 struct common_audit_data *ad)
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800404{
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400405 int i;
406 struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
407 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800408
409 if (sp) {
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800410 for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
Dave Jones67644722006-04-02 23:34:19 -0700411 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800412
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700413 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
414 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400415 peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
Venkat Yekkiralae0d1caa2006-07-24 23:29:07 -0700416 break;
417 }
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800418 }
419 }
420
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400421 /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
422 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
423 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
424 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
425 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800426}
427
428/*
429 * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
430 * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
431 * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
432 * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
Venkat Yekkirala67f83cb2006-11-08 17:04:26 -0600433 * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800434 */
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400435int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
436 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800437{
438 struct dst_entry *dst;
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800439
Venkat Yekkirala67f83cb2006-11-08 17:04:26 -0600440 switch (proto) {
441 case IPPROTO_AH:
442 case IPPROTO_ESP:
443 case IPPROTO_COMP:
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400444 /* We should have already seen this packet once before it
445 * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
446 * check. */
447 return 0;
Venkat Yekkirala67f83cb2006-11-08 17:04:26 -0600448 default:
449 break;
450 }
451
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400452 dst = skb_dst(skb);
453 if (dst) {
454 struct dst_entry *iter;
Venkat Yekkirala67f83cb2006-11-08 17:04:26 -0600455
Paul Mooreeef9b412013-07-23 17:38:39 -0400456 for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) {
457 struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
458
459 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
460 return 0;
461 }
462 }
463
464 /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
465 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
466 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
467 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
468 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
Trent Jaegerd28d1e02005-12-13 23:12:40 -0800469}